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Abstract. Motivated by the convergence result of mirror-descent algorithms to market equilibria in
linear Fisher markets, it is natural for one to consider designing dynamics (specifically, iterative al-
gorithms) for agents to arrive at linear Arrow-Debreu market equilibria. Jain reduced equilibrium
computation in linear Arrow-Debreu markets to the equilibrium computation in bijective markets,
where everyone is a seller of only one good and a buyer for a bundle of goods. In this paper, we
design an algorithm for computing linear bijective market equilibrium, based on solving the rational
convex program formulated by Devanur et al. The algorithm repeatedly alternates between a step of
gradient-descent-like updates and a follow-up step of optimization. Convergence can be ensured by a
new analysis different from the analysis for linear Fisher markets.
1 Introduction
A market can be thought of as an algorithm or mechanism that implements a social choice of redistribution
of various goods between agents (as buyers and sellers for goods) via pricing. In mathematical economics,
exchange market models were first proposed by Walras in 1874 and later by Arrow and Debreu in 1954 along
with the concept of market equilibrium [3]. These exchange market models are used to capture the essence
of complicated real-world markets.
In the Arrow-Debreu market model, each agent has an initial endowment of divisible goods and a utility
function for purchasing a bundle of goods that maximizes her utility when every agent uses the revenue from
selling her initial endowment. The Fisher market model [4] can be seen as a special case of the Arrow-Debreu
model. In it, each buyer is subject to her budget constraint instead of the revenue from selling her initial
endowment. There is a market equilibrium4 if two conditions are satisfied:
– Buyer Optimality, in which every agent uses the revenue from selling her initial endowment to purchase
a bundle of goods to maximizes her own utility
– Market Clearance, in which the total demand for every good equals the total supply
The celebrated theorem by Arrow and Debreu [3] proved the existence of a market equilibrium under some
mild necessary conditions for the utility functions. The most common types of utility functions from this
⋆ This paper appeared in preliminary form in ICCOPT 2019 (the 6th International Conference on Continuous
Optimization).
⋆⋆ Corresponding author, supported in part by MST 105-2221-E-009-104-MY3
4 Note that the concept of market equilibria is not the same as the concept of Nash equilibria. A market equilibrium
does not allow buyers to strategically report their interests in different goods in order to maximize their own
utilities.
class, which are described in more detail in the section of preliminaries, are the linear, Leontief, and Cobb-
Douglas functions, and belong to the important class of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions
[17,2].
Given the convergence of distributed generalized gradient-descent algorithms (i.e., mirror-descent) to
market equilibria in the Fisher and CCVF markets [4,10], it is natural for one to consider designing dynamics
(specifically, iterative algorithms) for agents to arrive at market equilibria in Arrow-Debreu markets.5 In this
paper, instead of using generic algorithms for solving a convex program, i.e., convex program solvers, we
design iterative algorithms for solving the following convex program for bijective markets where everyone is
a seller of only one good and a buyer for a bundle of goods:6 We give the formulation here for the following
discussion. Our algorithm for computing linear Arrow-Debreu market equilibria is based on solving the
rational convex program that captures buyer optimality and market clearance, formulated by Devanur et al.
in [11].
min
∑
j pj log
pj
βj
−∑i,j bij log uij∑
i bij = pj ∀j∑
j bij = pi ∀i
uij/pj ≤ 1/βi ∀i, j
pi ≥ 1 ∀i
bij ≥ 0 ∀i, j, βi ≥ 0 ∀i,
where bij is paid by agent i to agent j for good j, pi “acts like” the endowed budget Bi of agent i in the
Fisher model (yet there is no actual budget but only the initial endowment of goods for agent i), and βi is
agent i’s inverse of “best” bang per buck.
Mirror Descents for Fisher Markets. Recall that when designing distributed algorithms via mirror
descents for Fisher markets [4], each βi is endogenously set to 1 in the convex program above (there is no
concept of variable βi so there is no need for to update βi). The convex program is then as follows.
min
∑
j pj log pj −
∑
i,j bij log uij∑
i bij = pj ∀j∑
j bij = Bi ∀i
bij ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
The objective function becomes
ϕ(b) =
∑
j
pj log pj −
∑
i,j
bij log uij =
∑
i,j
bij log
pj
uij
,
and the feasible space is
S = {b ∈ Rn×m :
∑
j
bij = Bi∀i, bij ≥ 0∀i, j}
where pj =
∑
i bij . The components of the gradient of ϕ are thus
(∇ϕ(b))(i, j) = 1− log uij
pj
.
5 We can even require the dynamics to be of the no-regret property to provide incentives for the agents if possible
[16,6,7,8].
6 Jain [14] reduced the equilibrium computation in linear Arrow-Debreu markets to the equilibrium computation in
bijective markets.
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The projection back to the feasible space is applied on vector b′′ = (b′′i )i = (b
′′
ij)ij after the update such
that b′′ = b − η∇ϕ(b) for a learning rate η and b′ is the feasible point after projection. The choice of
the regularization function and thereby the corresponding Bregman divergence decides the actual distance
measure for projection. The Proportional Response (PR) dynamics are the multiplicative updates that result
from the Bregman divergence being the KL-divergence and η = 1:
b′ij =
1
Zi
bij(
uij
pj
)
where Zi is chosen such that
∑
j bij = Bi. The update of bij does not need to depend on the information of
any other agent (given that any price pj is publicly known), so it can be done in a distributed way.
7
Alternating Algorithms for Bijective Markets. In the above formulation, other than bij , there is one
more set of variables we need to consider: βi for Arrow-Debreu markets. If we separate the updates of bij
and βi, we can alternate between updating bij and updating βi. Fixing one set of variables temporarily, we
can update the other variable set to decrease the objective value. This can be done repeatedly. One natural
attempt is to update bij using mirror-descent types of approaches and updating βi simply optimizing the
objective value. Careless updates of βi would defeat the purpose of optimizing the objective over bij (in the
manner described above).
Observe that βi ≤ pjuij for all i, j and that the objective is non-increasing with βi (since the derivative
with respect to βi is − piβi ≤ 0). Thus, we know that βi = minj pj/uij is the best possible value if we fix the
value of bij . Note that mirror descents and the convergence analysis in [4,6] will not work directly since we
will modify βi before each modification of bij . Nevertheless, we can show that a more flexible convergence
analysis for gradient descents will do the job. Thus, our approach in this paper is to alternate between
1. a gradient-descent step of updating bij (with the previously chosen βi), and
2. an optimization step (instead of the gradient-descent step) of updating βi (with pj determined by the
previously chosen bij in Step (1)).
Specifically, Step (2) is done by each agent i computing βi = minj pj/uij (the inverse of the best bang per
buck given the previously fixed pj in Step (1)). This can be done distributedly for each agent i.
To prove the convergence, we have to ague the following.
– Each gradient step decreases the current objective value by some amount when using a new analysis for
gradient descents with a convex objective other than those in [4] and [6].
– Step (2) does not increase the objective value given the previously chosen bij in Step (1).
Note that we need such a new analysis because the convex function for which we perform the gradient-descent
step keeps changing. It does so because it is the convex objective in which each βi is fixed to the value chosen
in previous iteration.
1.1 Related Work
For Fisher market equilibria, the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [13] can capture the equilibrium allocation
for buyers with utility functions from the same class in the CES family. The problem of equilibrium computa-
tion was introduced to the theoretical computer science community by Devanur et al. [12]. The proportional
response dynamic is equivalent to a generalized gradient-descent algorithm with Bregman divergences on a
convex program that captures the equilibria of Fisher markets with linear utilities [18,4]. The tatonnement
7 When the Bregman divergence is defined to be half the Euclidean distance, the algorithm becomes the gradient
descent algorithm. The projection can be applied to the whole vector b as in [4]. Alternately, one can apply mirror
descents with respect to bi separately on the objective and show that, jointly, the objective still converges to
minimum (as has been done for congestion games [6,7,8]).
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process is a simple and natural rule for updating prices in markets. Cheung et al. [10] established that
tatonnement is like a generalized gradient descent that uses the Bregman divergence for the class of Convex
Conservative Vector Field (CCVF) markets.
Jain [14] reduced the equilibrium computation in linear Arrow-Debreu markets to the equilibrium com-
putation in bijective markets. Chen et al. [9] showed that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market
equilibrium with additively separable utilities is PPAD-complete. Devanur et al. [11] formulated a rational
convex program for the linear Arrow-Debreu model to characterize a market equilibrium.
In almost all the market models we discussed previously, every buyer can shop for goods from every
seller. This implies that the agents (buyers/sellers) reside in an underlying network that is a complete graph.
In reality, trading may only happen between two immediate neighbors in a graph that is not necessarily
complete. Kakade et al. [15] considered Arrow-Debreu markets with such generality and designed algorithms
that compute approximate equilibria.
If buyers are allowed to strategically report their interests in different goods in order to maximize their own
utilities, the market becomes a market game [1,5] in which Nash equilibrium can be used as the equilibrium
concept. The Fisher market game was first studied by Adsul et al. [1] for buyers with linear utility functions.
Adsul et al. showed the existence of pure Nash equilibria under mild assumptions and provided the conditions
necessary for a pure Nash equilibrium to exist. Braˆnzei et al. [5] showed that a Fisher market game for buyers
with linear, Leontief, and Cobb-Douglas utility functions always has a pure Nash equilibrium. Braˆnzei et al.
also bounded the price of anarchy for Fisher market games.
2 Preliminaries
An Arrow-Debreu market M consists of a set A = {1, ..., n} of agents that trade a set G = {1, ...,m} of
divisible goods among themselves. Each unit of good g ∈ {1, ...,m} can be bought by an agent at price pg.
The vector of prices is p ∈ Rm+ (R+ = {x ≥ 0}). Each agent i purchases a consumption plan xi ∈ Rm+ . Each
agent i has an initial endowment wi ∈ Rm+ of the m goods, where wij is the amount of good j initially held
by i. These initial goods can be sold to other agents and thus provide agent i with revenue. The revenue can
in turn be used to purchase other goods. Every agent i has a utility function Ui : R
m
+ → R+, where Ui(xi)
describes how much utility agent i receives from the consumption plan xi. An Arrow-Debreu market can
then be described as M = (A,G, u, w).
We now introduce the followin general Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function family,
which has the most widely used classes.
Ui(xi) = (
m∑
j=1
uij · xρij)
1
ρ (1)
where −∞ < ρ ≤ 1, ρ 6= 0. The Leontief, Cobb-Douglas, and linear utility functions shown below are given
when ρ approaches −∞, approaches 0, and equals 1, respectively.
Leontief : Ui(xi) = min
j∈m
{xij
uij
} (2)
Cobb−Douglas : Ui(xi) =
∏
j∈m
x
uij
ij (3)
Linear : Ui(xi) =
∑
j∈m
uijxij (4)
The Leontief function captures the utility of items that are perfect complements. The Linear function captures
the utility of items that are perfect substitutes. The Cobb-Douglas function represents a perfect balance
between complements and substitutes.
When G = A, i.e., wij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, the Arrow-Debreu market becomes a bijective
market. The utility of agent i for the good of agent j is uij ≥ 0. The directed graph (A,E) has an arc ij for
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every pair with uij > 0. Jain [14] reduced Arrow-Debreu markets to bijective markets as follows. If a good
is included in the initial endowment of multiple agents, we give a different name to each good. If an agent
has k goods in the endowment, we split the agent into k copies that have the same utility function and each
owns one of the goods. Consequently, we can focus on the equilibrium computation for bijective markets
since any solutions would also work for Arrow-Debreu markets.
In a market equilibrium, we have a set of prices p : A → R+ and allocations x : E → R+ that satisfy
the following conditions [11]. First, agents use an optimal plan at price p if every agent is allocated a
utility-maximizing bundle subject to their constraints. This reduces to the following.
– For every i ∈ A, if xij > 0, then uij/pj is the maximal value over j ∈ A.
– pi > 0 for every i ∈ A.
The market clears if
∑
i∈A xij = 1
8 for every j ∈ A, i.e., every good is fully sold, and pi =
∑
j∈A xijpj for
every i ∈ A, i.e., the money spent by agent i equals her income pi.
2.1 Convex Program for Linear Bijective Markets
Our algorithm for computing linear Arrow-Debreu market equilibria is based on solving the rational convex
program formulated by Devanur et al. in [11]. Devanur et al. presented a rational convex program for the
linear bijective market that guarantees the existence of a market equilibrium. We need to formally introduce
the convex program here before giving our alternating algorithm in the next section.
min
∑
j pj log
pj
βj
−∑ij bij log uij (5)∑
i bij = pj ∀j ∈ A∑
j bij = pi ∀i ∈ A
uij/pj ≤ 1/βi ∀i, j ∈ E
pi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ A
b, β ≥ 0
Note that uij is the utility of agent i for the item of agent j. Variable bij is the money paid by agent i
to agent j. Variable βi represents the inverse best bang-per-bucks of agent i. Let b = (bij)ij , β = (βi)i, and
y = (b, β). The money spent by agent i equals i’s income pi (revenue from selling her initial endowment) at
market equilibrium, i.e., pi =
∑
j∈A xijpj . The allocation can be derived by xij = bij/pj. Therefore, we can
focus on y. The objective function is
Φ(y) = min
∑
j
pj log
pj
βj
−
∑
ij
bij log uij .
The space of feasible solutions is
S = {b ∈ Rn×m, β ∈ Rn : bij ≥ 0∀i, j, uij/
∑
i
bij ≤ 1/βi ∀i, j,
∑
j
bij ≥ 1∀i}.
The space of feasible b’s fixing the values of β is
Sβ = {b ∈ Rn×m : bij ≥ 0∀i, j, uij/
∑
i
bij ≤ 1/βi ∀i, j,
∑
j
bij ≥ 1∀i}.
8 W.l.o.g., we assume that
∑
i∈A wij = 1 for every j ∈ A since only wii = 1 and wij = 0 for i 6= j in bijective
markets.
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From [11], the following condition is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. (The argument is
provided in the appendix.)
(*) For every strongly connected component S ⊆ E of the digraph (A,E), if |S| = 1, then there is a loop
incident to the node in S.
The result from [11] shows the feasibility of such a convex program.
Theorem 1 (Thm 1.1 of [11]). Consider an instance of the linear Arrow-Debreu market given by graph
(A,E) and the utilities u : E → R+. The convex program (5) is feasible if and only if (*) holds, and, in
this case, the optimum value is 0, and the prices pi in an optimal solution give a market equilibrium with
allocations xij = bij/pj. Further, if all utilities are rational numbers, then there exists a market equilibrium
with all prices and allocations also rational and of a bitsize polynomially bounded in the input size.
Instead of just using generic algorithms to solve a convex program, we aim to design other algorithms to
solve this rational convex program.
3 Alternating Algorithm
Let K be the convex feasible space with diameter d, and the objective φ : K → R is a convex function
satisfying the property that there exists positive λ, γ ∈ R such that for any ξ ∈ K, 0  ∇2φ(ξ)  λI, and
‖∇φ(ξ)‖2 ≤ γ.
In our case, define φβ(b) = Φ(b, β), which is the objective function fixing a value of β; K consists of the
feasible solutions
Sβ = {b ∈ Rn×m : bij ≥ 0∀i, j, uij/
∑
i
bij ≤ 1/βi ∀i, j,
∑
j
bij ≥ 1∀i},
fixing the values of β. One can check that at each t, Sβt and φβt satisfy the diameter assumption and property
with appropriate settings of d, λ, and γ. We have the following proposition, whose proof is in Appendix 1.
Proposition 1. For Kt = Sβt and ξ ∈ Kt, 0  ∇2φβt(ξ)  λI with λ := n.
We can obtain the gradient ∇φβt(b) with respect to b by taking the derivative of bij for each i, j, i.e.,
∇φβt(b) = (
∂φβt(b)
∂bij
)ij = (1− log βiuij
pj
)ij . (6)
Let bt ∈ Kt, b′ = bt − η∇φβt(bt), and bt+1 = ΠKt(b′) = argminz∈Kt ‖z − b′‖22, for a positive η ≤ λd
2
γ2
.
The idea is to keep the current values of βt but update b using the gradient with respect to b. We denote
component i, j of b at t as bt(i, j) and component i of β at t as βt(i). Thus, this is like (1) first moving from
Algorithm 1 Alternating algorithm
1: bt+1 = ΠK(bt − η∇φβt(bt)).
2: βt+1(i) = minj pt+1(j)/uij for each i where pt+1(j) =
∑
i
bt+1(i, j).
point (bt, βt) to point (bt+1, βt) and (2) then moving from point (bt+1, βt) to point (bt+1, βt+1). Repeat
these two steps, and we need to show that this alternating algorithm converges. We have to show that Step
(2) does not increase the objective value given bt+1(i, j)’s, and that each gradient step decreases the current
objective value by some amount. We do this by using a new analysis for gradient descents with a convex
objective. We derive a market equilibrium for a linear Arrow-Debreu market.
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3.1 Convergence
We first introduce the following lemma that is a convergence result of standard gradient-descent dynamics.
Using this technical lemma whose proof will be shown in the next subsection, we then obtain the convergence
for our alternating algorithm.
Lemma 1. Let b ∈ K, b¯ = b − η∇φ(b), and b′ = ΠK(b¯) = argminz∈K ‖z − b¯‖22, for a positive η ≤ λd
2
γ2
.
Whenever φ(b)− φ(q) ≥ dγ√6λη for q = argminz∈K φ(z),
〈∇φ(b),b′ − b〉 ≤ − η
3d2
(φ(b) − φ(q))2. (7)
With Lemma 1, we can show our main result of convergence for the alternating algorithm. Intuitively,
this main result means that when the current value of the objective function Φ is far away from the optimum,
given a fixed value of β, the gradient descents guarantee that the update of b decreases the objective value
by a certain amount. The update of β only speeds up the convergence process.
Theorem 2. The alternating algorithm converges.
Proof. By Taylor’s expansion at point (bt+1, βt) and the property of φβt in terms of λ,
φβt(bt+1) ≤ φβt(bt) + 〈∇φβt(bt),bt+1 − bt〉
+
λ
2
‖bt+1 − bt‖22.
The last term in the above inequality is at most, by b¯ = bt − η∇φβt(bt) and the definition of projection,
λ
2
‖bt+1 − bt‖22 ≤
1
2
λη2‖∇φβt(bt)‖22 ≤
1
2
λη2γ2.
By Lemma 1, we know that whenever φβt(yt)− φβt(qt) ≥ dγ
√
6λη for qt = argminz∈Kt φβt(z),
〈∇φβt(bt),bt+1 − bt〉 ≤ −
η
3d2
(φβt(bt)− φβt(qt))2
≤ −2λη2γ2
where ∇φβt(bt) = (∂φβt(bt)/∂bij)ij .
Therefore,
〈∇φβt(bt),bt+1 − bt〉+
λ
2
‖bt+1 − bt‖22
≤ −2λη2γ2 + λη
2γ2
2
≤ −3λη
2γ2
2
.
We obtain that
φβt(bt+1) ≤ φβt(bt)−
3λη2γ2
2
, (8)
which is exactly
Φ(bt+1, βt) ≤ Φ(bt, βt)− 3λη
2γ2
2
. (9)
Finally, the guarantee for Step (2) is not hard to see: for each i, we know that βt+1(i) is the best possible
value if we fix values of bij to bt+1(i, j) so βt+1 never gives a larger objective value than βt.
We conclude that the value of the objective function Φ converges to the set of (b, β) that give values
within dγ
√
6λη from the minimum.
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Convergence time. The value of the objective function has an upper bound, and the objective value
decreases by at least 3λη2γ2/2 until the value of the objective function Φ reaches the set of (b, β) that give
values within dγ
√
6λη from the minimum. Thus, one can upper bound the convergence time.
3.2 Proof of Lemma 1
By Taylor’s expansion and the property of φ in terms of λ,
φ(b′) ≤ φ(b) + 〈∇φ(b),b′ − b〉+ λ
2
‖b′ − b‖22. (10)
To bound the second term in (10), note that by the convexity of φ,
φ(q) ≥ φ(b) + 〈∇φ(b),q − b〉,
which implies that
−〈∇φ(b),q − b〉 ≥ φ(b)− φ(q) ≥ 0.
Let ∆ = −〈∇φ(b),q − b〉, and we know from above that ∆2 ≥ (φ(b) − φ(q))2. Now we are ready to show
that when ∆ ≥ 2ηγ2,
〈∇φ(b),b′ − b〉 ≤ −η∆
2
3d2
. (11)
Note that φ(b) − φ(q) ≥ dγ√6λη implies that ∆ ≥ dγ√6λη. By η ≤ λd2
γ2
, we have d
√
6λ ≥ 2γ√η, and thus
∆ ≥ dγ√6λη ≥ 2ηγ2, which satisfies the condition for Inequality (11).
Consider the triangle formed by b,b′, b¯. Let α1, α2, α3 denote the angles that correspond to the points
b,b′, b¯, respectively. Since b′ = ΠK(b¯) and b ∈ K, we know that α2 ≥ π2 and thus pi ≤ π2 . (When y′ = y′′,
we use the convention that α2 = α3 =
π
2 .) As b¯ = b− η∇φ(b), we have that
〈∇φ(b),b′ − b〉 = ‖∇φ(b)‖2‖b′ − b‖2 cos(pi − α1)
= −‖∇φ(b)‖2‖b′ − b‖2 cosα1,
which is at most 0 since cosα1 ≥ 0. Moreover, because α2 ≥ π2 , we have that
‖b′ − b‖2 ≥ ‖b− b¯‖2 sinα3 = η‖φ(b)‖2 sinα3.
Thus, we derive that
〈∇φ(b),b′ − b〉 ≤ −η‖φ(b)‖22 cosα1 sinα3.
What is left to be shown are the lower bounds for cosα1 and sinα3.
Consider the triangle formed by b,q,b′, and let α4 denote the angle at point b. Then, we need the
following two claims, whose proofs will be provided in the following two subsections.
Lemma 2. If ∆ ≥ 2ηγ2, α4 ≥ α1.
Lemma 3. If ∆ ≥ 2ηγ2, sinα3 ≥ cosα43 .
With these two claims, we obtain
〈∇φ(b,b′ − b)〉 ≤ −η‖∇φ(b)‖
2
2 cos
2 α4
3
.
Recall that −∆ = 〈∇φ(b),q − b〉 =
‖∇φ(b)‖2‖q− b‖2 cos(pi − α4) =
− ‖∇φ(b)‖2‖q− b‖2 cosα4. Thus,
cosα4 =
∆
‖∇φ(b)‖2‖q− b‖2 ≥
∆
d‖∇φ(b)‖2 ,
and we have proven Inequality (11).
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Proof of Lemma 2 Consider the triangle formed by b, b¯,q. Let b¯′ be the point on plane b− b¯− q such
that the triangles b− b¯− y¯′ and b− b¯− b′ are identical. (b¯′ = b′ if the triangles b− b¯− q and b− b¯− b′
are on the same plane.) Clearly, angle b¯−b− b¯′ equals angle b¯−b−b′, which is α1. Thus, we can consider
triangle b− b¯− b¯′ instead of b− b¯− b′.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that α4 < α1. Note that since η ≤ ∆2γ2 ≤ ∆γ2 ,
‖b− b¯′}2 ≤ ‖b− b¯‖2 = η‖∇φ(b)‖2 ≤ ∆
γ
≤ |〈∇φ(b),b − q〉|‖∇φ(b)‖2 ≤ ‖b− q‖2.
This implies that line b−q must intersect the line b¯′−b¯ at some point z with ‖z−b¯‖2 < ‖b¯′−b¯‖2. However,
since b,q ∈ K and K is convex, we know that z ∈ K, we know that z ∈ K and thus ‖z − b¯‖2 ≥ ‖b¯′ − b¯‖2
by the definition of b′. This is a contradiction as ‖b′ − b¯‖2 = ‖b¯′ − b¯‖2. We can conclude that α4 ≥ α1.
Proof of Lemma 3 Since α4 ≥ α1 and ‖yt − q‖2 ≥ ‖yt − y¯′‖2, b¯′ must lie inside triangle b − b¯ − q,
which implies that the line passing through q and b¯′ must intersect line segment b − b¯ at some point w.
Let a1, a2, a3 denote angles b− q− b¯′, q− b¯′ − b¯, and w − b¯− b¯′, respectively.
We first claim that a2 ≥ π2 . To see that, we compare it with angle b¯− b′ − q, denoted as a′2, which is at
least π2 . Since triangles b− b¯− b¯′ and b− b¯− b′ are identical, angle b− b¯− b¯′ (denoted as θ¯) is the same
as angle b − b¯ − b′ (denoted as θ), which implies that angle b¯′ − b¯ − q is at most angle b′ − b − q since
b¯′ lies on the same plane as b− b¯− q. Since ‖b′ − b¯‖2 = ‖b¯′ − b¯‖2, if we rotate triangles b′ − b¯ − q and
b¯′ − b¯− q along line q− b¯ to make them lie on the same plane, b¯′ must lie inside of triangle b′ − b¯− q. As
a′2 ≥ π2 , we must have that a2 ≥ a′2 ≥ π2 .
Next, note that α3 = a2 − a3 ≥ π2 − a3 and a3 = a1 +α4. So, sinα3 ≥ sin(π2 − a1 −α4) = cos(a1 + α4) =
cos a1 cosα4 − sin a1 sinα4 ≥ cosα4
√
1− sin2 a1 − sin a1 as sinα4 ≤ 1 and sin a1 ≥ 0. Moreover,
sina1 ≤ ‖b−w‖2‖b− q‖2 ≤
‖b− b¯‖2
b− q
≤ η‖∇φ(b)‖2
( ∆‖∇φ(b)‖2 cosα4 )
≤ ηγ
2 cosα4
∆
≤ cosα4
2
.
As a result, we have that sinα4 ≥ cosα4
√
1− 14 ≥ cosα43 .
4 Future Work
Agents may strategically report their interests in different services in order to maximize their own utilities
in markets. When we allow this and treat the market equilibrium computation as a mapping from a given
report, we are studying market games. As far as we know, it is still an open question Nash equilibria exist
in “Arrow-Debreu market games” (as in Fisher market games [5]). It would be also interesting to consider
different classes of underlying social networks that describe crowd structures [15].
There are some price-of-anarchy results in Fisher market games [5]. Another interesting research direction
might be better bounding the price of anarchy for Fisher/Arrow-Debreu market games.
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Ling-Wei Wang for useful discussions.
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A Argument of Condition (*) for Theorem 1
We restate the argument of [11] here. Assume that {k} is a singleton strongly connected component without
a loop. Let T denote the set of nodes different from {k} that can be reached on a directed path in E from
{k}. In an equilibrium allocation, the agents in T ∪ {k} spend all their money on the goods of the agents in
T , which implies that pk = 0, contrary to our assumption that pj > 0 for every j ∈ A.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let b ∈ Sβ . Consider any i, k ∈ A, j, l ∈ G. First, we have
∂φβ(b)
∂bij
= − log uij + log pj
βi
+ 1 = 1− (log uij − log pj
βi
) = 1− log uijβi
pj
.
Let pj =
∑
i bij . Thus, we have
∂φβ(b)
∂bij
= 1− log uijβi∑
i bij
.
Next, note that except for i = k, we have
∂2φβ(b)
∂bij∂bkl
= 0,
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and if i = k, we have
∂2φβ(b)
∂bij∂akl
=
1∑
i bij
=
1
pj
.
This means that each entry of the Hessian matrix ∇2φβ(b) is at most n. Then for any z ∈ R, we have
z⊤ · (∇2φβ(b)) · z = (
∑
i
zij
1
pj
)ij · z
=
∑
i,j
zij(
∑
i
zij
1
pj
)
=
∑
j
1
pj
(
∑
i
zij)
2
≤
∑
j
(z1j + z2j + ...+ znj)
2
≤
∑
j
(|z1j |+ |z2j |+ ...+ |znj |)2
≤
∑
j
(12 + 12 + ...+ 12)(z21j + z
2
2j + ...+ z
2
nj)
= n(
∑
i,j
z2ij).
The first inequality is by pi ≥ 1. The third inequality is by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. This implies that
∇2φβ(b)  αI with α = n.
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